The securitized workplace : document protection, insider threats and emerging ethnographic barriers in a South Korean organization by Prentice, M.M.
This is a repository copy of The securitized workplace : document protection, insider 
threats and emerging ethnographic barriers in a South Korean organization.




Prentice, M.M. orcid.org/0000-0003-2981-7850 (2021) The securitized workplace : 
document protection, insider threats and emerging ethnographic barriers in a South 
Korean organization. Journal of Organizational Ethnography. ISSN 2046-6749 
https://doi.org/10.1108/JOE-02-2021-0010
This author accepted manuscript is deposited under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-
commercial 4.0 International (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) licence. This
means that anyone may distribute, adapt, and build upon the work for non-commercial 
purposes, subject to full attribution. If you wish to use this manuscript for commercial 




This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) 
licence. This licence allows you to remix, tweak, and build upon this work non-commercially, and any new 
works must also acknowledge the authors and be non-commercial. You don’t have to license any derivative 
works on the same terms. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
The securitized workplace: document protection, insider threats and emerging 
ethnographic barriers in a South Korean organization 
Michael M. Prentice  




The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how document protection has become a key 
object of concern for organizations, how the threat of leaks has led to an increase in security 
technologies and policies and how these developments present new and emergent 
ethnographic challenges for researchers. Through a study of a South Korean organization, the 
paper aims to demonstrate the ways workplace documents are figured into wider legal, 
regulatory and cyber security concerns. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
The research is based on 12 months of intensive embedded fieldwork in a South Korean firm 
from 2014 to 2015 and follow-up interviews in 2018. The author followed an immersive and 
inductive approach to collecting ethnographic data in situ. The author was hired as an intern 
in a Korean conglomerate known as the Sangdo Group where he worked alongside Human 
Resources managers to understand their work practices. The present article reflects 
difficulties in his original research design and an attempt to analyze the barriers themselves. 
His analysis combines ideas from theories of securitization and document studies to 
understand how the idea of protection is reshaping workplaces in South Korea and elsewhere. 
 
Findings 
The paper highlights three findings first that South Korean workplaces have robust socio-
material infrastructures around document protection and security, reflecting that security 
around document leaks is becoming integrated into normal organizational life. Second, the 
securitization of document leaks is shifting from treating document leaks as a threat to 
organizational existence, to a crime by individual actors that organizations track. Third, that 
even potential document leaks can have transitive effects on teams and managers. 
 
Originality/value 
Organizational security practices and their integration into workplace life have rarely been 
examined together. This paper connects Weber's insights on bureaucratization with the 
concept of securitization to examine the rise of document security practices and policies in a 
South Korean organization. The evidence from South Korea is valuable because 
technological developments around security coupled with organizational complexities 




As high-profile leaks of corporate and government information from Wikileaks to the 
Panama Papers attest, documents have become a key medium through which publics can 
pierce the figurative veil of large corporations, government actors and other organizations. 
Such leaks appear to confirm conventional notions of organizations and government bodies 
as singular, enclosed entities for whom the loss of documents represents a significant harm. 
This goes against a broad set of literature in organization studies that has long shown that  
organizations and organizational boundaries are layered, porous, overlapping, competing, 
contingent and fuzzy in practice (Paulsen and Hernes, 2003; Dahles and Leng, 2005; 
Czarniawska, 2008; Scott and Davis, 2007). Indeed, organizational researchers have long 
been skeptical of formal, reified accounts of organizations (Bittner, 1965), yet corporate 
espionage, data regulations and cyberattacks, alongside the continued reliance on documents, 
the rise of digital text production and information/data hoarding, have nevertheless helped to 
reinforce the idea of an inside–outside distinction [1].  
Ethnographers are keenly aware of the difficulty accessing such “inside” locations 
poses. For anthropologists, gaining inside access has often been understood as a social 
problem, such as accessing the worlds of elites, powerful economic actors or auratic 
institutions like Hollywood (Gusterson, 1997; Ortner, 2010; Souleles, 2018; see also Seaver, 
2017), under the assumption that such actors do not want to be studied and are protecting 
their own secretive spaces from outsiders. Anthropologists have found ways of working 
around these constraints through creative ethnographic methods, such as Garsten’s (2010) 
and Ortner’s (2010) notions of “interface” ethnography. These are important for demystifying 
the “inside” as a special or necessary zone of action that ethnographers must reach to study 
powerful actors or institutions (see Monahan and Fisher, 2015). However, in the search for 
new and alternative methods outside the organization, the question of why internal access for 
ethnographic research is (ever more) closed off to the ethnographer has not been readily 
explored. Rather than seeing employees, elites or organizations as the eternal gatekeepers (or 
gateclosers) that prevent access to outsiders, this article foregrounds how security concerns 
around document leaks and document protection are mediating questions of access.  
As the global interest in leaks and cyberattacks suggests, written documents have 
become one of the key objects of security concerns, particularly in white-collar organizations, 
where records, reports, emails, contracts and a host of other inside written genres form a 
quasi-protected class of artifacts. Where documents have long been treated as an object of 
office floor practice and sense-making in organizations (see Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 186–207), I 
foreground the ways that the document leak has become a zone of organizational threat and 
risk. Through an “insider” ethnography of a South Korean corporate organization called 
Sangdo and more general descriptions of document security in South Korea, I describe how 
concerns over document protection spread across different socio-technical modalities, 
including legal agreements, digital scanning devices, physical infrastructures and normative 
concerns among co-workers.  
A concern for document protection (if not documents per se) is undergoing what 
Weber would have described as an effect of bureaucratization: the “concentration of the 
material means of management in the hands of the master” (1978, p. 850). This is to say that 
documents are not just an instrument of bureaucracy, but now a concern of it, particularly 
their form, storage and ownership. This is significant not only because it represents another 
frontier of bureaucratic creep, but because it contributes to what Weber described as “the 
“separation” of the administrative staff. . .of officials and employees, from the material 
resources of administration,” or (borrowing Marx’s phrase) “the expropriation of the 
expropriator” (Weber, 2004, p. 38). In other words, such a move has started to delineate 
organizational insiders from the organizational inside. Documents, as I will discuss, are 
increasingly becoming preserved within organizations, but are also being separated from 
those we might imagine as the preservationists. This is particularly evident amidst new 
narratives and expertise around “insider threats.” Insider threat discourse has problematized 
employees as individuals who, due to bad intentions, stress, or carelessness, cause potential 
harm to their organizations by allowing outsiders to access, ransom or damage inside 
“property” [2]. These narratives (alongside new cyber security projects and data regulations) 
have naturalized the idea of data and documents as basic units of property that must be kept 
“within” an organization.  
In this sense, workplaces are increasingly become securitized. By securitized, I draw 
on the concept of “securitization” which was originally developed by critical international 
relations scholars (Buzan et al., 1998; McDonald, 2008) and which captures the way that 
certain kinds of people, groups or objects become discursively framed as threats to a national 
or international order in order to legitimize exceptional, protective measures against them. 
While more commonly used to critique threats to global peace posed by non-conforming 
nations or panics of mass migration which seem to “threaten” domestic polities, the concept 
is useful for understanding, and critiquing, the spread of security narratives, technologies and 
policies within organizations. Here, exfiltration or loss of documents constitutes an existential 
threat to an organization, motivating various “securitizing moves” such as instituting multi-
factor encryption and new document security protocol. In this article, I describe increasing 
sociotechnical efforts in South Korea to hyper-protect organizational documents as well as 
security norms around the protection of documents as new benchmarks for employee 
(mis)behavior. Behind, surrounding, and shaping everyday office practices and workplaces 
lies a complex assemblage of apparati.  
In my analysis of ethnographic data from South Korea, I suggest that such 
securitization is making workplaces new “spaces of security” (Maguire and Low, 2019). One 
of the effects of this is increasingly treating employees, including higher-level managers, as 
quasi-outsiders vis-_a-vis documents. That is, as documents become seen as a kind of 
property that belongs in the office, employees become relegated to “users” with “access” to 
such material rather as trusted guardians of it themselves. For ethnographers, this trend shifts 
the understanding of “access” itself, as it becomes premised not solely on access to people or 
spaces through good ethnographic knowhow, but on access to people who have certain kinds 
of access to documents in certain kinds of spaces. Ethnographers may find formal 
employment organizations even more difficult to access as a result, but it also has 
implications for what we consider an organizational insider, in an era when employment 
might be understood less around organizational roles (the purely social), and more on models 
derived from legal and IT (the social in relation to material/digital property).  
My analysis is based on embedded participant observation at the “Sangdo Group,” a 
pseudonym for a large South Korean industrial conglomerate. My research with Sangdo 
entailed working as an intern in the headquarters for a period of one year in 2014–2015 while 
being allowed to conduct daily observations and both formal and informal interviews with 
white-collar employees, managers and executives. I was also able to speak to some former 
employees for informal follow-up interviews in 2018. My initial ethnographic goal was to 
look at the relationship between office democratization discourses and genres of work among 
white-collar workers in South Korea. Methodologically, I intended to gather and analyze 
different genres and practices (meetings, emails, intranets, document-writing and so on) 
within teams across one organization, in the spirit of research on genres of management (e.g. 
Yates, 1989; Turco, 2016) [3]. Even though I was permitted to conduct research internally 
through my role as an intern working at the headquarters and had ample social access to 
different employees to shadow, interview or develop informant-like relationships, I also 
encountered visible and invisible barriers to accessing and analyzing documents or other 
written or digital artifacts. For example, though I often asked my coworkers in Human 
Resources about different genres I was interested in, like emails, memos or formal reports, 
they were often reluctant to give me examples or photo-copies. Nominally an “insider” on the 
team, they did not alert me to the presence of digital files commonly used by other members 
of the team until near the end of my fieldwork. As an official “intern”, I found myself often at 
the fringe (or bottom rung) of internal document visibility,with access to company 
magazines, generic announcements on the intranet, internal websites, document templates 
and low-level projects I worked on. When I ended my formal research with Sangdo in 2015 
and left Seoul, I felt disappointed due to the lack of access to the kinds of knowledge 
embedded in documents I knew existed and thought would be necessary for my dissertation. I 
initially thought this lack of access represented my coworkers’ silent disavowal of my 
research (despite our year working side-by-side). In hindsight, I have come to see their 
actions as part of a broader concern around document security, which increasingly entangled 
them in complex forms of responsibility.  
Following an anthropological tendency to use such barriers as ethnographic facts in 
and of themselves, I revisited my original ethnographic fieldnotes and conducted extra 
interviews on a return visit to the company in 2018 in the development of this article. Though 
much of my original data reflected concerns about new ideas about equality, merit and two-
way communication in the South Korean workplace, other aspects of my notes and 
discussions with employees reflected a high degree of concern and awareness for document 
security measures, as well as conflicts between managerial expectations of authority and 
emerging IT controls.  
South Korea offers a privileged position from which to understand the shifting 
dynamics of documentation and security. On one side, the South Korean economy is still 
dominated by large conglomerates, known as daegieop, inclusive of what are often referred to 
as “chaebol” in international management [4]. As conglomerates, such organizations are 
intersected by complex financial ties, shared production and operations, and management 
hierarchies across many subsidiaries. Their outwardly unified image (such as Samsung 
Electronics, Samsung Heavy Industries, Samsung Life Insurance) is undercut by a vast array 
of competing administrative systems and hierarchies that span multiple subsidiaries. These 
administrative systems are mediated by an array of forms, reports and planning genres that 
intersect and complicate working life. It is not uncommon for South Korean office workers to 
describe their work derogatively as “bureaucratic” (gwallyojeok) based on the time spent 
writing reports. On the other side, South Korea represents an interesting case from the point 
of view of a robust digital infrastructure: the country has one of the highest broadband and 
smartphone penetration rates in the world spurred by pro-active government policies since the 
late 1990s that have promoted digitization of services at national and local levels (Jin, 2017; 
Yang, 2017). Alongside this, South Korea was one of the first countries to implement robust 
digital security protocol in the form of public-key infrastructure beginning in the late 1990s 
(Park, 2015).  
In what follows, I first situate the article in the context of scholarship on documents 
and securitization to suggest that documents have become a key material artifact through 
which new organizational security concerns have become concentrated. Turning to the 
Korean case, I describe how organizational documents exist in a wider economy of leaks in 
relation to public transparency and exposure in South Korea. Elements of document security 
and control are inscribed into various technologies, formal policies and informal practices in 
corporate office spaces and concern over leaks is increasingly leading to an individualization 
of threats. In the final section, I describe two periods of time at Sangdo: during my research 
in 2014–2015, document security measures were commonplace, but managers had their own 
authority to handle team-level and individual document security. When I returned in 2018, 
employees described a new cloud-based encryption system that had greatly affected their 
working relations by encrypting every digital document and increasing internal surveillance 
of document movement. In the conclusion, I suggest how securitization complicates 
ethnographic research encounters in organizations and how ethnographers can work within 
such constraints.     
 
Documents and securitization of the firm  
Weber famously described bureaucracy in relation to documents. “Management of 
modern offices,” he wrote, “is based on written documents (the files)which are preserved in 
theirwritten or draft form” (Weber, 1978, p. 957, emphasis added). Yet the relationship 
between documents and their “preservation” within bureaucratic organizations (including 
corporations) has remained largely a functional one. In one of the few studies of the history 
of document storage, Yates (1982) described the advent of vertical filing cabinets in relation 
to the need to preserve organizational memory in the early twentieth century American 
corporation. The proliferation of cloud storage services, worries that corporations hoard 
documents and data, and new discussions of data sovereignty, suggest that the preservation of 
documents has become less a functional necessity to access documents quickly and more 
associated with fear of attack and exposure to outsiders. Situating these concerns within a 
longer perspective on capitalism, media theorist Lisa Gitelman understands documentation 
itself as a kind of enclosure movement. She has described the continued refinement of 
documentation techniques into the twenty-first century as an articulation of the “micrologics 
of enclosure and attachment” (Gitelman, 2014, p. 32) – that is, an attempt to enclose and 
contain content in a material form, especially as documents move within and across 
organizational spaces. These “micrologics” are visible in the rise of physical efforts to store 
and copy documents in archives, legal efforts to attach copyrights and digital efforts to 
reproduce the same text anytime, anywhere and in any format [5].  
Today, with the exception perhaps of radically transparent organizations, it is largely 
axiomatic that companies or organizations do not reveal their information to outsiders, 
particularly written or digital documents. It is indeed quite rare that the public even 
encounters organizational documents. There are legal and regulatory reasons for this, such as 
the protection of personally identifying information and concerns over intellectual property. 
But another reason is the counter-effect of transparency discourses over the latter half of the 
twentieth century: transparency movements, driven by an ideology of communication 
associating documents with knowledge, and possession with control, have led to more 
concern about leaks, and greater concern over information enclosure in turn (Fenster, 2005, 
2015) [6]. There are many classes and genres of documents that have little value to 
organizational information, such as sticky notes, records, drafts of PowerPoint slides or 
internal message boards, that also become wrapped up in such concerns. Indeed, there has 
been only one large-scale email corpus made available from an actual company – the Enron 
corpus (see Diesner et al., 2005) – that has become published as part of organizational 
analysis, reflecting that it is accepted among academic researchers and publishers alike to 
treat documents as proprietary objects [7].  
Such securitization could be understood as a new kind of workplace surveillance, but 
organizational actors also become involved in workplace security. In their research on 
“security in the wild,” Dourish et al. (2004) discussed how staff at a research lab did things 
that seemed to overelaborate organizational security practices in ways not formally mandated, 
such as including notices about legal and illegal use of attachments at the bottom of their 
emails, or covering their screens with paper to prevent others from seeing information when 
they left their desks (p, 396). In South Korea, employee access cards, a basic security device, 
have become fashion-like status items, with one’s headshot, name, corporation and 
sometimes department visibly displayed which most employees wear on a lanyard all day 
long. More generally, anthropologist Schull (2018) has described new moral discourses 
emerging around digital information storage. Individuals in digital societies, she notes, are 
increasingly being asked to monitor their own data and to make sure that one’s “self-data” are 
properly contained, protected and tracked. These practices reflect the fact that organizational 
security is no longer a fact decided by the organization through basic secrecy levels or access 
controls (Gusterson, 1996, pp. 68–100; Yost, 2015). Security is co-produced by employees, a 
fact reinforced in digitally managed personal lives. The variety of different adaptations to 
security, sometimes going above and beyond what is required, is suggestive of the ways that 
employees have some authority in enacting security and protection based on their own 
knowledge and familiarity with their environments. In this sense, even in a regime in which 
they are protecting documents as property, they are also enrolled and delegated as guardians 
too. It is precisely this understanding that began to cleave during and after my fieldwork at 
Sangdo. I first turn to describing a more general context of leaks in South Korea. 
An economy of leaks  
Concerns over the misappropriation of company information and documents are a 
persistent feature of headlines in South Korea. Former President Park Geun-hye was removed 
from office in 2017 after a neglected tablet was uncovered by a journalist and contained 
copyedited drafts of presidential speeches made by an unofficial consigliere figure, Choi 
Soon-sil. More generally, public transparency relies on public fact-finding through revealed 
or misplaced documents that seem to confirm insider secrets [8]. One of the most common 
forms of public gossip is known as jjirasi, short messages containing salacious gossip about 
politicians and celebrities that circulate by mobile phone. In corporate circles, “securities 
jjirasi” (jeung-kwon jjirasi) are reports containing insider and advanced information on 
corporate news and scandals the aim of which is to alter stock prices. And among corporate 
groups, there is a notion that some offices hoard documents more than others: the Samsung 
Group, for instance, was revealed in 2005 to have its own secret archive of secret documents 
known as the “X-files” (x pail) that was reputed to be more thorough than the Korean CIA’s 
and through which they could strategically leak private information about those who 
criticized the conglomerate.  
In South Korea, leaks can and do have consequences. In corporations, employees can 
abscond to competitors in tightly competitive industries. And in regulatory audits, 
prosecutors, tax officials or police can conduct raids on large corporate groups, carrying out 
boxes of paper documents to be photographed by the press as a sign of “checking the books.” 
While conducting research at the Sangdo Group, I learned of one subsidiary which faced an 
unexpected tax raid in which government investigators came into the office and extracted 
digital files from every computer in the office via specially made USB keys. Public 
investigations of internal dealings can lead to fines, public scrutiny or increased regulatory 
oversight. And sensitive information related to owners’ activities can lead to reputational 
damage. These acts nevertheless undergird the idea that files, both digital and paper, are the 
objective source of such secrets and thus act as a kind of valued, internal property that bear 
important information on privileged actors, regardless of whether they contain anything of 
informational value.  
Within such a context, large corporate office towers in Korea act as veritable 
fortresses. For visitors, portable storage devices are temporally confiscated, disabled or 
logged in a book. Smartphone cameras are taped over to prevent photographic theft of 
documents. The same mechanisms apply as much to employees: employee bags can be 
scanned on their way out of work, local storage on hard drives can be automatically erased 
every night and IT departments can monitor what is written on emails or documents. One 
interviewee I spoke to at a large conglomerate mentioned their company had remote software 
that could disable employees’ mobile phone cameras and audio-recording simply when they 
entered the building. Another noted that their IT departments scanned internal documents and 
emails that mentioned the word “chairman” (hoejang) for potential gossip leaks. Because of 
these security concerns, I never saw employees work on documents on the train or subway, or 
even take physical paper home, even in briefcases. As such, working from home for 
corporate employees was largely an  anomaly in (pre-pandemic) South Korea. The tethering 
of documents to office spaces was one reason Korean white-collar employees spent so much 
time at work.  
Concerns over document leaks are of course not unique to South Korea, and even 
within the country there are vast differences in policies across companies. I highlight 
however the degree to which the securitization of document leaks manifested in an array of 
social and material modalities for protection, based on my ethnographic observations at 
Sangdo. At the time, the group did not have high-tech document protection systems, but did 
have other mechanisms, such as conventional document classifications delineating possible 
arenas of circulation. These included stamps and graphics saying “outside-forbidden” 
(daeoebi) as well as “outside-inside forbidden” (daenaeoebi) for higher status documents that 
were not to circulate internally. Such classifications could be placed at the top of emails or 
internal memos and physically stamped onto a cover page. Furthermore, employees at 
Sangdo had to sign legal statements at the beginning and end of their employment attesting 
that they would not take (or had not taken) any company documents from their place of work. 
At the beginning of a calendar year, all employees had to re-sign “ethical management 
pledges” (yulli gyeongyeong silcheon seoyakseo) which they signed to aver they would not 
conduct any unethical business involving bribery or private dealing. Employees also had to 
agree to more detailed “information protection agreements” (jeongbobohoui dong-uiseo) in 
which they attested that they would protect company important secrets and related industrial 
information to the best of their abilities, as well as pledge to not reveal or take information 
when they left the company, and to report anyone who did so. (In the case of human 
resources information, the exfiltration of personnel data could generate a government fine for 
loss of personally identifiable information). For information related to operations, I had heard 
indirectly of instances in which the company’s auditing department itself sued individual 
employees who were found to have taken manufacturing or sales information when they left 
the Sangdo Group (though not necessarily between subsidiary companies) [9]. And before I 
left the company, the Auditing department was working on implementing a “real-time 
monitoring” (sangsi monitoring) system. Such a digital system, integrated into the shared 
group intranet, could allow them to track document uploads and movement across the entire 
conglomerate in a way that they could not previously.  
Some of the social and technological build-up of security efforts at Sangdo reflects 
legal and regulatory concerns toward organizational culpability; other facets however point to 
attempts to link documents to specific people. An IT manager at Sangdo relayed a story along 
these lines. According to him, the executives at one subsidiary had requested the IT 
manager’s team to modify the printer software so that employee names would appear on the 
bottom edge of every page as they had become concerned about leaks from their office. This 
would in theory preserve the image of a document without interfering in its visual display, 
while keeping a traceable record of who printed it. Later, the executives found out that 
employees could simply cut off the bottom edge to hide their names. Management then asked 
the IT department to change the printer again so that the employee’s name, their department, 
the date and the time would be printed diagonally across the middle of a document like a 
watermark, thereby making the person who printed it (not necessarily the author) inseparable 
from the content. My co-workers in the headquarters (with their unwatermarked documents) 
thought this practice to be quite an extreme response. They were surprised when a few years 
later it was mandated that their own documents also be printed in this way [10]. If that 
anecdote represents a mode of closely tying individuals to documents, popular representation 
of office dynamics demonstrates high concern for individual conduct around documents as 
well. There is a tense sequence in the widely popular Korean television drama (based on a 
graphic novel) Misaeng, or “An Incomplete Life,” that illustrates this. In the scene, an intern 
at the fictitious firm One International unwittingly picks up a sales proposal from a pile of 
documents that was meant to be shredded. In his rush to a meeting, the intern realizes his 
mistake and leaves the document on the lobby counter for a company security guard to 
dispose. The document slips to the floor where it is discovered by none other than a high-
ranking One International executive. Reading its source, the executive takes the proposal 
back to the sales team, where he rebukes the team’s manager for being careless with company 
information by allowing a company document to escape its office home. Once the executive 
leaves, the team manager and an assistant manager proceed to scold their junior team member 
who was supposed to have shredded the proposal. The junior team member, unaware of the 
intern’s mistake, is dumbfounded by how it got to the lobby in the first place. He nevertheless 
accepts blame for the mistake. This scene from the show (which was frequently discussed in 
the Sangdo office while it aired) reflects the way that individuals can become conditionally 
responsible for documents of which they are not authors and how this responsibility is tied to 
the individual reputations of others.  
I realized how seriously employees were aware of potential responsibility for retro-
active leaks after I defended my dissertation in 2017. When I shared my dissertation 
electronically with some employees at Sangdo as a token thank you for their cooperation (two 
years after leaving the company and South Korea), one manager replied to me with a request 
to correct part of my dissertation that he believed was in error: a mention I had made (even 
with a few degrees of anonymization) of using a hard drive of files from a previous company 
as reference in his current work; he made no other comment about the dissertation. Even 
though the files were not from his current role, there was nevertheless a concern, I suspected, 
of a kind of second-order caution being represented on paper. That is, he did not want to be 
seen as someone who might take documents from job to job, especially if other members of 
Sangdo were to read the dissertation (in English no less). This confirmed another 
retrospective observation during my time at the company in 2014–2015: any document I 
came to observe or store on my work computer was either previously accessible or part of a 
finite work project. My requests to employees of genre examples that I could use in my study 
(e.g. a spreadsheets, PowerPoints or emails) were usually met with no responses or offers for 
quick “walk-throughs” on their own screens [11]. It is of course entirely reasonable that 
employees would not want to share documents arbitrarily to a temporary foreigner-interloper 
like myself; however, where a common answer might be that secrecy was a core part of their 
“group-ness” (in Simmelian fashion), I suggest that part of it has to do with such second-
order concerns around document leaks and perceived harm to their organization, and perhaps 
from it as well. As I describe in the next section, Sangdo employees were socialized to be 
highly aware of document protection.   
 
From guardians to threats  
When I was embedded with an HR department at a Sangdo subsidiary for a few 
weeks during my research, I helped members of HR clear old documents from a closet to take 
to a shredder. Some of the employees discovered a pile of English-language test score results 
from the mid- 1990s. The documents, which had been produced on an older style of computer 
paper and had become discolored over time, contained a long list of names and numerical test 
results. Given they were headed for the shredder and involved employees long gone, I 
thought they might prove valuable for comparison with modern contemporary document 
formats. I asked a few junior employees if I could hold onto a few as a sample which they 
thought was fine. As I was looking over them at a desk, a senior HR manager came over, 
grabbed the pile from my desk and tossed them into a plastic bag to be shredded. The senior 
manager did not offer any verbal reason for doing so, but the message was clear that I was 
not to siphon off such documents, even for perusal. In a similar incident, during a small 
project I was working on in the headquarters HR team, a junior manager told me about a 
shared server that the team used to share and store digital files for team projects. Despite 
being an intern-researcher on that team for around eight months and being an insider with 
them in many other senses, I had not known about the server’s existence nor the files stored 
on it. To my surprise, I found a neatly organized server containing all the team’s projects for 
that year and years prior. When I finished a draft of the report for the project, I emailed a 
senior HR manager to let him know that I had uploaded it to this server for his review. The 
next day the senior HR manager sequestered two HR employees one-on-one in back-to-back 
meetings in a small meeting room. After meeting both, he called me in to tell me he had been 
concerned with how I had gotten access to the server and that he had been interrogating his 
two subordinates to trace the process. His concern, overlooked by one of the junior managers 
at the time, was that my access to the server meant that I would be able to see too many of the 
headquarters HR department documents, including certain documents related to promotions, 
especially their drafts and revisions. He was overtly concerned with a moral hazard: I, the 
unwitting ethnographer, might unwittingly take documents containing personal information 
out of the office or be exposed to information from the documents that I was not supposed to 
know (such as promotion or salary documents). He was apologetic but told me that I would 
lose access to the server as my knowledge of the files could jeopardize the team’s work. By 
doing so, he was preventing a transitive risk to the other members of the team whose blame 
might be entailed by letting a putative outsider access their information in the first place.  
While these two incidents appear to reflect the same kind of panic over potential 
documents leaks and inappropriate access discussed in the previous section, they also reflect 
an orientation to the roles employees took vis-_a-vis securitization. That is, during my main 
fieldwork in 2014–2015, employees, particularly managers, took on roles as active guardians 
of both documents and employees in their charge. In the first case above, the HR manager 
may have prevented viewing of such documents, but she also did not reveal the incident to 
others or report me to the auditing team. In the second case, the HR team’s local server acted 
as a border within a border: such a private server was separate from the formal intranet 
service and was confined to the team’s own workspace. It also served to define a team unit by 
both its shared knowledge and memory of work (the files), and by the knowledge and 
understanding of the existence of the server in the first place. The existence of such a server 
goes both beyond what an organization might require – securing and organizing documents 
on a shared local server, but also against what an organization might require in terms of 
common document security (as an “off-the-grid” server with no password). It also reflected 
the authority that teams at the time understood as the flexibility in document security 
measures. HR documents, for instance, are a particularly sensitive category within 
organizational documents and the team had other means of protecting such files (like filing 
cabinets with locks and special access restrictions on the group intranet). Nevertheless, 
potential breaches like mine could act as a means of socializing members to the unique 
professional challenges. (In another incident, the team manager took responsibility for an 
error that his junior team member made on a document that was given to the chairman). 
Managers had some autonomy to preserve their (team’s) own documents [12]. Where 
employees might risk leaks, they might receive a scolding from their team manager, but not 
face other consequences of a more substantial leak.  
It could be said that these cases reflected specificities of human resource practice 
(which tends to deal with individual employee information) or my own role as an outsider/ 
ethnographer. However, junior employees on different Sangdo teams exhibited concerns for 
documents in their own small spheres of practice in ways that went beyond simply legal or 
regulatory concerns, reflecting socialized norms for protecting documents. For instance, a 
few employees individually bought computer monitor filters to prevent passers-by from lunch 
or went home at night. Similarly, they used leatherbound folders when transporting 
documents from one department to another to conceal idle glances. These small acts reflect 
what Shires (2018) has termed “security rituals,” or acts that enact images of security and 
secure behavior, but may not necessarily be related to specific security demands of an 
organization. Though junior employees were not as responsible or aware of the breadth of 
document security, they nevertheless exhibited their own forms of document protection in 
their own spheres of activity in particularly visible ways. When I returned to Sangdo in 2018 
for a follow-up visit, Sangdo had undergone a significant change from when I had been there 
three years prior. An HR team manager informed me that the entire digital document 
infrastructure of the Sangdo tower (which housed many of the companies in the group) had 
been “clouded.” By “clouded,” a term he coined in English, he referred to a new document 
storage and access system. Every single document at their office, the Sangdo holding 
company, was to be stored on company cloud servers, not local shared (team-based) hard-
drives, nor even local computers. This would allow all documents to be encrypted, preventing 
their legibility by outsiders without an encryption key. However, this affected internal access 
as well: documents could no longer be simply copied or opened; they now had to now be 
requested, approved and accessed, reflecting a new layer of security-derived terminology for 
thinking about documents. Employees on the HR team reported that they now had to ask their 
team managers for approval to open even their own documents. This added layer of 
administration, in their comments to me, had rendered their organizational roles into one of 
document approvers and requesters, rather than HR specialists. Sensing the changes in the 
times, one team manager told me he was now learning the coding language R to add to his 
managerial toolkit. (As a company outsider at this point, I could only hear about how their 
changes were going rather than observe inside for any length of time).  
An IT manager described the reasons for the new document storage system. It was 
developed at the request of company owners who were worried about document leaks and 
hacks, particularly about leaks of manufacturing secrets to overseas competitors. The IT 
manager explained this in the idiom of a criminal investigation: ownership had the power to 
trace a document if it ever got leaked, like CCTV. According to him, it was not necessary to 
actively prevent document leaks – documents could only be read with an encryption key as it 
were, rendering other forms of security somewhat moot. But attention toward individual 
responsibility around documents was heightened: new metadata scripts allowed IT managers 
to go back to a log of activity and see which employees last had access to a particular 
document and then narrow down potential suspects for fraud or malpractice, making it easier 
to identify or prosecute leakers, ill-intentioned or not.  
This development reflects a more general trend linking the digitalization of work with 
the securitization around leaks that has affected many office-based and document-dependent 
workplaces in recent years. (It is fair to say even academics have become literate in concepts 
like multi-factor authentication these days.) Yet the ethnographic observations from Sangdo 
reflect a subtle shift in the implicit roles that managers and employees had in the system of 
protection. In the pre-“clouded” environment, managers had the authority to preserve and 
store their own documents in their own ways, and monitor the conduct of their own 
employees. This reflected an ethos that was managerial in nature: while following some 
general rules, managers were responsible for the conduct of their team’s documents and were 
delegated the authority to do so. In the cloud-based encrypted system, all documents had 
become objects of a crime-based approach to security which in turn flattened employees to 
“users” with specific kinds of access rights; mistakes, in theory, had a quasi-criminal, not just 
a moral, quality to them. Where once managers had a remit of authority around their own 
members, the IT function was now taking on new powers of control over work practice and 
the securitization of both people and documents across many teams. While the examples from 
seeing their screens. They also covered drafts of documents with blank paper, flipped them 
over or filed them in drawers to prevent inadvertent viewings when they left their desks for 
Sangdo represent one development in this direction, a recent report from Nikkei Asia about 
South Korean technology giant Samsung suggests that the future direction of security 
technologies centered around document tracing may intertwine technological sophistication 
and individual criminalization in even more complex ways:  
At one [Samsung] laboratory, the printing paper used in copying machines contains 
metal foil, part of a detection system intended to stop employees from printing out 
sensitive information and taking it out of the lab without permission. Alarms sound if 
the paper leaves the building [13].  
 
Conclusion: emerging ethnographic barriers  
This article has discussed the increasing securitization of document leaks in 
contemporary organizational ecosystems. By securitization, I have adapted a term from 
international relations and focused on the ways that documents are increasingly treated as 
protected objects within organizations, a fact evident in the rarity of organizational files being 
shared in public as well as the increasing number of security apparati dedicated to storing, 
securing and more often, encrypting digital files in ways largely indiscriminate of genre or 
content. A key part of this securitization is the linking of employees to document circulation, 
through new technologies and policies that can individuate their relationship to documents 
[14]. Despite millennial narratives that predicted or advocated a gradual paperless worklife, 
documents and the arts of documentation are deeply woven into contemporary corporate 
work worlds, in South Korea as elsewhere (Sellen and Harper, 2003). This is certainly true in 
terms of coordinating work among distributed teams; but I have also suggested that it is true 
in terms of thinking about documents as fictive property in an information age, whether or 
not files are actually valuable in circulation. Files might contain intellectual property, 
personal information or company secrets, but in many cases they are coming under a blanket 
bureaucratic logic of protection. Here returning toWeber is useful: where he might have 
predicted that bureaucratic domination results in the “leveling of “status honor”’ (Weber, 
1978, p. 975) among people – such as in this case, going from guardians of company 
documents to simply users equal under IT – the same can also be said of leveling among 
document genres. Under an IT lens, documents lose many of their substantive qualities as 
types with meaning and context and are largely treated the “same” when rendered as “data” 
or “files” that must be preserved by virtue of where they were produced.  
Such securitization is not necessarily leading to the kind of organizational secrecy as 
transparency advocates might predict or fear. Such concerns imply that employees or insiders 
are motivated to gird themselves against outsiders; rather, the dynamic here is one in which 
the “inside” is being gradually separated from the human actors that occupy it, leaving an 
inventory of documents qua property. This explains the close integration of digitalization 
with techniques of individuation. The ethnographic data from the South Korean organization 
Sangdo emphasized how this security turn represents an increasing focus on individuals as 
the bearers of responsibility. Through encountering a shift in how documents were preserved 
at Sangdo, I noted that the role of managers and employees was also shifting in relation. This 
led to a case in which even high-level managers were being associated suspiciously in regards 
to such objects of security, rather than as their guardians. Such concerns are never completely 
unfounded of course; leaks do happen and can cause material harm to individuals or 
organizations. However, securitization logic can spread categorically, rendering substantive 
differences or local workarounds problematic. In this regard, South Korea’s increasingly 
digitized and high-speed workplaces reflect not just a place to consider one possible future of 
an evolving digital workplace, but an environment marked by increasing securitization which 
is shifting the relationship between employee and organization.  
Increasing securitization of document leaks will have an impact on ethnographic 
research across many types of organizations in three ways. First, securitization may delimit 
access to domains of organizational practice for ethnographers to see, discuss or even collect 
certain artifacts accessing a field. Document protection itself is a new kind of gatekeeper, in 
other words. Ethnographers may not face difficulty in interviewing, following, or being in an 
organization, but may be relegated to areas of an organization that befit someone with 
“lowlevel” access. Discussions with higher-level or more sensitive work areas may be limited 
to interview interfaces, away from sites of actual practice. There is of course much to be 
gained from techniques of “polymorphous engagement” by interacting with organizational 
actors outside of organizations (Gusterson, 1997) and collecting publicly available documents 
(Zilber, 2014, pp. 102–104), especially to remove the prestige and “mysterium” (Grey and 
Costas, 2016) that is often accorded to insider spaces. But it is worth pointing out how 
document secrecy concerns may be one reason for organizational (in)accessibility in the first 
place. Document security and its “rigid designators” for user-based access control might be 
shaping the terms and limits of an ethnographer’s access to a field. At Sangdo, I benefited 
from researching the company at a time in 2015 when managers had more autonomy over 
document storage and I had some freedom to peruse what I could. To conduct research in 
2018 when they implemented the “cloud” system would have vastly changed what I could 
have perused, asked about, or collaborated on. Second, an ethnographer’s relationship to 
employees or other organizational actors will be altered as new risk vectors emerge in 
relation to documents in the field. As I have alluded to in this article, South Korean 
employees are highly attuned to who has access and how this might implicate themselves or 
others. Moreover, increasing use of metadata and paper-based tracking to trace the origins 
and movement of files may create new paper-trails for employees in sharing files with 
ethnographers, even when satisfying other institutional research demands. Ethnographers 
themselves may face unknown risks depending not only on what questions they ask, but what 
files they see. Third, there may be increasing legal and IT conditions to what ethnographers 
can analyze out of the field. Even if document data is properly anonymized and circulated for 
purely academic purposes, it may fall under logics of increasing digital criminality and 
malfeasance that go beyond traditional university-based ethical reviews. Like the IT manager 
who described the CCTV-like ability to trace back documents, considerations of documentary 
traceability may be a concern even if they do not pose a perceivable risk at the level of 
informant or subject relations.  
Critical approaches to securitization are meant to ultimately question the basis of why 
security “problems” exist and at what political ends they are aimed. My adaptation of the 
concept here – to understand securitization in an organizational setting – suggests that it will 
not be so simple just to unmask the many layers of legal, regulatory, digital and normative 
security toward documents that intersect contemporary organizations. As part of the 
ethnographic process, ethnographers may need to become literate in the basics of 
organizational (cyber) security as well as spell out terms of access at the beginning of 
projects, especially as informal workarounds become excised. Furthermore, they may also 
need to creatively figure out ways of accessing sites of practice without compromising 
research participants or informants, such as by asking for “blank” document templates, 
collecting old printouts or working on files in situ without “moving” them and leaving a 
digital trace. Ethnographers might even topicalize everyday security as part of the research 
project to understand how employees live with and make do in new security environments 
where they are being recast from privileged insiders to insider threats. This may also involve 
new subjects of organizational research. Much of my knowledge of the IT infrastructures and 
systems at Sangdo and in the South Korean corporate world came unexpectedly from 
coworkers in IT roles who were friendly enough to describe security changes and effects 
without disclosing actual files. In this sense, the myriad barriers ethnographers face in a 
securitized workplace are not just something to get past, but themselves should become part 
and parcel of ethnographic investigation itself.  
One future direction for the study of insider-ness vis-_a-vis securitization is to 
reconsider not only the ethnographer-subject or ethnographer-organization role, but how 
internal boundaries are also being reshaped along these lines as well. This is already apparent 
with auditing or oversight institutions which can claim access to documents (through audits) 
or create their own document standards (such as financial reporting). Quarterly financial 
reporting, and the bevy of financial templates that accompany it, is one way in which a 
relationship of external governance is premised precisely on a kind of legitimized document 
exfiltration that has become normalized over time. Here, the “security” question elides with 
governance issues, as large corporations, particularly publicly traded ones, must submit 
themselves to certain kinds of “leaks” of their information lest they be deemed financially 
opaque. However, another relationship merits attention: organization-internal relations of 
documentary security. Leaks are clear boundary-crossing events as they go from a private to 
a public space, but we might ask about when a document moves from one office to another. 
Commonsense as it is to treat organizations as bounded units, organizations like Sangdo are 
complex conglomerates that have clearly delineated subsidiaries and offices. How might 
employees be judged if they share documents with another team or an IT department grants 
access to confidential files to all executives but not upper-level managers? How might a 
headquarters establish relationships with its subsidiaries through document requests, or 
conversely, institute new disciplinary measures for document misappropriations? Difficulty 
of access aside, issues that involve the ambiguity of internal borders, the bureaucratization of 
organizational life and the complexity of material practices are ripe for new kinds of 
ethnographic encounters. While the new securitized workplace is not going away, it may 
afford new questions even as it redefines barriers for insiders and outsiders alike.  
Notes  
1. Indeed “new” organizational forms premised on models of sharing, transparency or open 
networks go against this account, but I would suggest that their organizational novelty 
highlights that a larger majority of organizations are bound by increasing strictures of 
document and information security, especially in an era of international data protection 
regulations and cyberattacks.  
2. See for instance the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University which 
has become a leading hub of expertise on cyber security and insider threats. Such research 
hubs naturalize a sense of criminality that surrounds employees when it comes to digital 
work: “[E]mployees can become easy and willing targets of pressure from criminals and 
foreign agents, or they might become disgruntled and careless on the job.” Source: 
https://www.sei.cmu.edu/our-work/ insider-threat/index.cfm. Accessed September 9, 2019.  
3. Each co-worker on the HR team formally consented to be part of a long-term study on 
office social life and other employees who I interviewed consented to the research protocol as 
well.  
4. Sangdo is an example of what is known in South Korea as a daegieop (“large corporation”) 
or geurubsa (“group company”). Organizationally, the Sangdo Group had around a dozen 
subsidiaries involved in metal and steel manufacturing. The subsidiaries were linked, as in 
many other Korean conglomerates, by a holding company which also had certain centralized 
managerial powers. An owning family had a majority control over the holding company.  
5. For Gitelman, the protagonist of modern digital document infrastructures is not the 
database, the hypertext or HTML, but the PDF (Gitelman, 2019). As an exemplar format, the 
PDF coheres information into a form of fixed pseudo-property to prevent it from being 
edited, re-authored or recombined. A PDF, or portable document format, is the documentary 
equivalent of a universal Turing machine. Based on PostScript language, a PDF file can 
reproduce documents from other programs into an image, rendering them into a common, 
intermodal format, around which other machines, codes and services revolve (Dourish, 2017, 
pp. 18–22).  
6. Such dynamics parallel debates around “data sovereignty” which envisions data control as 
a matter of territorial control. See Amoore (2018).  
7. This is not to say there are no studies of documents or other written genres. However, 
many studies of office documents talk about documents, but are rarely able to re-present them 
or their contents.  
8. Former President Park also had a blacklist of almost 10,000 public figures and artists who 
were critical of her and who would not be granted state funding as a result.  
9. South Korea instituted a comprehensive data protection act called the Personal Information 
Privacy Act (PIPA) in 2011 which strictly regulated the storage and circulation of personally 
identifying information (PII) by organizations that manage it. It has a close resemblance to 
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which was instituted in 
2018. Agencies such as the Ministry of Interior and Safety regularly levy fines for companies 
that improperly manage personal data or allow documents containing personal information to 
leak, even during a cyberattack.  
10. The method of cutting off certain parts of a document to make it “circulable” is not unlike 
what Daniel Ellsberg did when copying the files that would later become bundled together as 
“the’ Pentagon Papers. With his helpers, he cut off the tops and bottoms of documents on 
which were written “TOP SECRET,” so as not alert those at photocopy shops (Gitelman, 
2014, p. 89).  
11. I have noted elsewhere (Prentice, 2015) how the semi-illicit circulation of documents 
(through former colleagues or previous projects) can prove to be useful in consultant work in 
South Korea.  
12. The fact that a separate “private” border was constructed reflects the way that categories 
of private and public or inner and outer have a “recursive” quality to them, as discussed by 
anthropologist Gal (2002). Ahome, for instance, is private relative to the public outside, but a 
bedroom might be private relative to a living room. The concepts are about the deployment of 
a boundary-bearing distinction, not about absolute boundaries in and of themselves. Any 
workplace exhibits this feature, as there are waves of both public areas and private areas, 
which can then be divided into further public and private distinctions (such as the lobby in 
front of an executive’s office.)  
13. “Samsung races to guard its secrets as China rivals close in” Nikkei Asia. February 12, 
2021. https:// asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Spotlight/Samsung-races-to-guard-its-
secrets-as-China-rivalsclose- in  
14. Hull (2003, pp. 287–8) has described how one of the basic features of bureaucratic 
techniques is its role in individuating action so as to affix responsibility for decisions.  
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